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Antibiotic reimbursement in a model delinked from sales: 
a benchmark-based worldwide approach
John H Rex, Kevin Outterson
Despite the life-saving ability of antibiotics and their importance as a key enabler of all of modern health care, their 
eff ectiveness is now threatened by a rising tide of resistance. Unfortunately, the antibiotic pipeline does not match 
health needs because of challenges in discovery and development, as well as the poor economics of antibiotics. 
Discovery and development are being addressed by a range of public–private partnerships; however, correcting the 
poor economics of antibiotics will need an overhaul of the present business model on a worldwide scale. Discussions 
are now converging on delinking reward from antibiotic sales through prizes, milestone payments, or insurance-like 
models in which innovation is rewarded with a fi xed series of payments of a predictable size. Rewarding all drugs 
with the same payments could create perverse incentives to produce drugs that provide the least possible innovation. 
Thus, we propose a payment model using a graded array of benchmarked rewards designed to encourage the 
development of antibiotics with the greatest societal value, together with appropriate worldwide access to antibiotics 
to maximise human health.
Introduction
Antibiotics have transformed modern medicine and 
society, but the development of resistance is inevitable 
with their use. Resistance is of particular concern as a 
result of the weak development pipeline and the 
emergence of strains for which there are few therapies.1,2
The causes of the thin pipeline are well understood: 
the discovery of antibiotics is diffi  cult, clinical 
development of antibiotics is constrained and costly, and 
economic return on new antibiotics is generally poor.3–5 
The fi rst two challenges are being addressed via 
collaborative public–private partnerships6 and updates to 
regulatory pathways.7–10 However, the economic challenge 
of antibiotics is rooted in a fundamental tension between 
the need for antibiotic conservation and the need for a 
sales-based return on investment to recoup development 
costs. New antibiotics are appropriately restricted from 
use, thus lowering sales. This decrease in sales leads to a 
low projected value and has reduced private antibiotic 
investment.5,7,11–13
Furthermore, estimating the market for a novel 
antibiotic is diffi  cult. For example, carbapenem-resistant 
Entero bacteriaceae (CRE) are one of three urgent 
pathogens listed in the 2013 threat assessment produced 
by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC);2 however, predicting the size of the market a 
decade from now is a struggle for companies. For 
example, the market in Sweden for such a drug eff ective 
against CRE is currently exceedingly small: the entire 
country recorded only 94 cases of isolation of CRE 
during 2007–13, with only 24 cases of symptomatic 
infection.14 Furthermore, an entirely new drug might 
not have been needed since 73% of the isolates were 
susceptible to at least three classes of antibiotics. In the 
USA, the CDC has estimated about 9000 clinical cases 
of CRE per year,2 but many of these will be susceptible 
to a few existing drugs. Thus, the actual number of CRE 
cases per year in the USA requiring a new antibiotic is 
likely to be less than 9000. If infection prevention eff orts 
are successful, future trends would be even lower: the 
US National Strategy projects a 60% decrease in CRE 
infections in US hospitals by 2020.15 These reductions 
are excellent public health targets but make the 
commercial case even more daunting.
Addressing the economic challenge via a 
delinked model
Breaking the link between sales volume and return on 
investment is one possible approach to resolving the 
tension between antibiotic stewardship and business 
imperatives. Antibiotic delinkage pays companies on 
some basis other than sales volume, such as value or 
milestone-based payments. Delinkage could be imple-
mented through payments of a predictable size and 
duration after successful registration of a new qualifying 
drug. Such payments would guarantee regulatory 
maintenance of the drug (eg, initial registration, 
maintenance of registration, pharmacovigilance, etc) 
and continuity in the supply chain (manufacturing 
base), whether the drug was prescribed or not.5,16,17
Calculation of the size of delinked payments
Economic models might be useful in estimating the size 
of potential delinkage payments on the basis of 
recovering research and development costs. One model 
of net present value (NPV) of a new antibiotic transforms 
a money-losing drug to one with an NPV of 
US$300 million at the start of the research and develop-
ment process through the promise of future payments of 
$500 million per year for the fi rst 5 years after initial 
registration.18 The Review on Antimicrobial Resistance19 
commissioned in the UK estimates a range from 
$2 billion to $4 billion for a full global patent buyout 
(depending on discount rate, costs, and probabilities of 
success), paid in a lump sum 3 years after registration. A 
model prepared for the US Department of Health and 
Human Services estimated that the US market for one 
new antibiotic could be covered with cash payments over 
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the product development cycle and at registration 
totalling $919 million.11 These models make assumptions 
that should be verifi ed in a transparent process, and need 
to account for the cost savings arising from government 
support. However, they provide a useful starting point for 
discussing buyout prices adequate to encourage work in 
this specialty (table 1).
Nevertheless, it does not seem reasonable to assign 
all antibiotics the same delinked reward. Experience 
shows that the usefulness of antibiotics varies, with 
some proving useful over time and others being 
withdrawn for a range of reasons.20 New antibiotics 
have historically been valued via marketing on the basis 
of product diff erentiation. A manufacturer would be 
motivated to select and develop candidate drugs that 
are medically relevant, dis tinguishable from existing 
drugs on the market, and hence commercially viable. 
Additionally, a manufacturer is motivated to continue 
development after the initial registration, generating 
incremental data that further support the drug’s use in 
preference to other drugs.
In a delinked model, however, these incentives will 
not be present in the same fashion. Off ering the same 
reward to all newly developed antibiotics would create a 
perverse incentive, spurring the development of drugs 
that off er the least possible incremental advantage over 
existing drugs. Furthermore, there would be no 
incentive for development beyond the minimum 
requirements. Most fundamentally, the cost of creating 
an antibiotic would not necessarily relate to the value of 
the drug to patients and society.
The notion of reimbursing for value is generally 
attractive, with value defi ned as incremental improve-
ments in human health.21 In the USA, Medicare and 
other payers are experimenting with paying for value in 
health care.22 Although this is a theoretically promising 
solution, concerns over how the eff ect of the antibiotic 
on health is measured and reimbursed need to be 
resolved. This research is underway via DRIVE-AB and 
the Innovative Medicines Initiative.
Analogy to the insurance value of fi re 
prevention and control services
Antibiotics could off er insurance value merely by being 
available for use, hence creating an environment 
wherein medical care, travel, and commerce can be 
confi dentially pursued. In this regard, antibiotics and 
infection control bear a striking resemblance to the fi re-
fi ghting infra structure: the microbiology laboratory 
serves as the smoke detector, medical personnel are the 
fi re fi ghters, and antibiotics are the water supply. All of 
these elements have to be established before the fi re 
(infection), since buildings burn (and patients die) far 
more quickly than infrastructure can be built. For 
example, an outbreak of plague in India in 199423,24 
caused as many as 200 000 people to fl ee the vicinity and 
cost the local economy an estimated $600 million. The 
costs of facing a hypothetical pandemic strain of CRE in 
London or New York are almost incalculable. The 
availability of an eff ective therapy would doubtless have 
reduced the overall level of public anxiety; however, the 
insurance value of the drug would have been present 
whether or not the actual epidemic had occurred, just as 
the fi re department is needed even if no fi res occur in a 
community. Calculations of the insurance value of 
antibiotics are in their preliminary stages,25 but the 
consequences of not having insurance26,27 should 
encourage participation in a worldwide scheme 
ensuring antibiotic availability.
Benchmarks for delinked incentives
Delinked incentives should require delivery to market 
of a qualifi ed drug; however, they equally need to 
recognise that initial approval is only one step towards 
under standing a new drug. The updated regulatory 
pathways that permit initial registration with small 
datasets in many ways implement an adaptive (or 
progressive) licensing approach28 in which initial 
registration is presumed to be followed by further 
investigations. Thus, delinkage should not be front-
loaded at the moment of registration, but instead 
spread across the period of time during which clinical 
evidence is still being developed.
To address these intertwined issues and in recognition 
of calls for research in this specialty (eg, from a 2015 
report by the European Parliament29), we discuss a 
delinked approach based on a combination of bench-
marked payments (table 2). In this proposal, qualifying 
novel antibacterial antibiotics receive delinked 
reimbursement for a standard term of 5 years beginning 
at the time of initial registration. This base amount 
would be paid to every qualifying drug via a single 
global buyer. The benchmarks provide a dynamic range 
by off ering additional payments up to four times greater 
than the base amount for unambiguous delivery of 
features that are more valuable to society. This 
benchmark payment is intended to be the net profi t 
earned by the developer.
The standard base reward amount should be 
calculated globally on the basis of reported models,11,18,19 
and be suffi  cient to create a reasonably positive NPV for 
For the DRIVE-AB initiative see 
http://drive-ab.eu
Payments from governments Expected NPV benchmark at 
commencement of R&D
Sertkaya et al11 $919 million (spread over entire R&D 
process and at registration; USA only)
$100 million 
Sharma and Towse18 $2·5 billion ($500 per year for 5 years) $300 million
Review on Antimicrobial 
Resistance19
$2–4 billion (paid 3 years after registration) Not stated
All values are in US$. R&D=research and development. 
Table 1: Nominal and expected net present value (NPV) estimates of the needed size of antibiotic 
delinkage payments
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initial registration for a single indication. Additionally, 
the amount should cover the cost of paediatric co-
development and account for previous public funding. 
Further modelling and public debate would be needed 
to ensure consensus on the base reward rate, but base 
payments around $200 million per year over 5 years 
would be consistent with present modelling data. Five 
conditions would increase the benchmark payments 
over the base amount: novel mechanism of action; 
addressing serious unmet medical needs; reducing 
health-care costs; targeting priority resistant pathogens; 
and post-approval label changes to expand the 
indications. Each additional benchmark payment would 
be made for 5 years and can start at or after initial 
registration.
First, substantial payments might be earned via 
discovery and successful development of a drug with a 
novel mechanism of action. In this proposal, 
mechanisms of action should be construed broadly 
rather than narrowly, since otherwise the developer 
could argue that slightly diff erent points of contact with 
a target qualify as a diff erent mechanism. For example, 
inhibition of a multicomponent enzyme at the same 
site as an existing drug (eg, inhibition at the catalytic 
site of GyrA and ParC, which are blocked by the 
fl uoroquinolones) would not qualify as a new class of 
antibiotic, but inhibition at an entirely new location on 
these large molecules (eg, the ATP binding site of GyrB 
and ParE) would qualify. A public consensus led by a 
respected neutral body would probably be needed to 
delineate how new mechanisms of action and 
antibiotics withdrawn from the market are classifi ed 
(eg, whether novobiocin, which is no longer marketed, 
is a previous example of an inhibitor of the ATP binding 
site of GyrB and ParE).30
Second, although the full payment for a novel 
mechanism cannot be earned by subsequent class 
entrants, substantial payments should be off ered to 
subsequent entrants solving problems such as toxic 
eff ects, dosing, and effi  cacy. This method deliberately 
encourages the development of improved drugs within 
a new class, since they provide substantial societal 
value.31
Third, additional benchmark payments should be 
made for reducing overall health system costs, such as 
oral administration of a drug, and adding value to 
society generally. Oral administration off ers a sub-
stantial benefi t to the overall health-care system by 
reducing the complexity of administration and by 
facilitating step-down and outpatient treatment. 
Furthermore, oral administration can promote access 
in resource-constrained populations.
Fourth, the development of drugs that target priority 
pathogens selected through a global threat assessment, 
similar to the one done in the USA by the CDC, should 
result in additional benchmark payments.2 In the CDC 
threat assessment,2 resistant pathogens were triaged 
through an expert assessment into three categories: 
urgent, serious, and concerning. Higher payments 
would be made for drugs that target pathogens in the 
urgent category and a lesser amount for those in the 
serious category. No additional payments would be 
awarded for the concerning category, since that is the 
baseline for entering the delinked reward structure.
Finally, additional payments should be made after 
further clinical studies that expand the drug’s label to 
include new indications. These payments will provide an 
incentive for developers to pursue further study after 
initial registration. The developer should receive a suitable 
reward for the eff ort even if it cannot be part of the initial 
registration. Distinct indications could include com-
munity-acquired bacterial pneumonia, hospital-associated 
or ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia, complicated 
and uncomplicated urinary tract infection, complicated 
intra-abdominal infection, acute bacterial skin and skin 
structure infection, endocarditis, meningitis, osteo-
myelitis, infectious arthritis, uncom plicated sexually 
trans mitted diseases, and the Unmet Need indication 
proposed by the European Medicines Agency.
Similar to incentives pertaining to the mechanism of 
action, it will be important to avoid the distorted 
Annual payment*
Drug approved at US FDA and European Medicines Agency to treat 
at least one defi ned infection‡ caused by at least one or more 
pathogens listed on the CDC 2013 threat assessment as either 
urgent, serious, or of concern to public health2
Base payment†
Has a clinical spectrum of activity on the label that includes one or 
more urgent pathogens on the CDC 2013 threat assessment§
Bonus equal to one base payment
Has a clinical spectrum of activity on the label that includes one or 
more serious pathogens on the CDC 2013 threat assessment§
Bonus equal to 50% of a base payment
Is the fi rst approved drug to act via a given mechanism of action¶ Bonus equal to a base payment
Is the second, third, or fourth agent approved to act via a given 
mechanism of action
Bonus equal to 75% of a base payment 
for a second agent, 50% for a third 
agent, or 25% for a fourth agent
Is the fi fth or subsequent agent to act via a specifi c mechanism of 
action but off ers a medically relevant improvement in safety, 
effi  cacy, or ease of dosing
Bonus equal to 10% of a base payment
Delivery of agreed paediatric commitment studies|| Payments based on model or separate 
contract open to tender
Is approved for a second, third, or fourth defi ned infection‡ for a 
specifi c agent||
Bonus equal to 25% of a base payment
Approved in oral dosage form|| Bonus equal to 25% of a base payment
Benchmark payments are paid annually for 5 years from the date the benchmark is fi rst met. *Payments are 
additive and new drugs can earn various benchmarks. The payment for an oral drug labelled for an urgent 
pathogen that has a novel mechanism of action (eg, multidrug-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae) would be 3·25 times 
the base amount (one base amount, one bonus for urgent, one bonus for new mechanism of action, and a 
0·25 base rate bonus for oral formulation). Additional bonuses could be earned for this drug in subsequent years by 
up to three label extensions in other infections, up to 0·75 of a base amount. †All new agents are expected to earn 
this payment (it is the minimum bar). ‡Defi ned infections are aggregated broadly rather than narrowly. §A new 
drug can earn one or both of these payments; the payment in each category can only be earned once (coverage of 
various urgent pathogens does not earn several payments). ¶Mechanisms of action are defi ned broadly rather than 
narrowly. ||If a benchmark is met as part of the initial drug approval, these benchmark payments will be paid 
annually for the full 5-year contract term provided that the sponsor maintains the drug on market. If a benchmark 
is met subsequently, payment will be made annually for a full 5-year contract term; however, this additional 
payment will start at the date the benchmark was met. 
Table 2: Estimated benchmark payments for new antibacterial antibiotics
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incentives that might ensue if indications are too 
narrowly divided. Hence, fi ne distinctions should not 
be drawn (eg, uncomplicated cervical, anal, uretheral, 
and oropharyngeal gonorrhoea would not qualify as 
four forms of uncomplicated gonorrhoea). Again, 
public consensus on defi ned indications would 
probably be needed.
Implementation of such a scheme has to consider 
the perspective of the companies investing in new 
agents. First, the values assigned to the benchmarks 
should be modelled against expected company 
investment and public benefi t. They need to be robust 
enough to encourage companies, but not so large that 
society does not obtain excellent value. For example, if 
society expects a company to invest $93 million in 
post-approval phase 4 studies over a 5-year period, then 
the expected NPV of these studies should be positive 
based on the models. By one model, the necessary 
reward for this scenario is $70 million per year, paid 
over the following 5 years.18 This reward is surprisingly 
large because of the assumption of an 11% discount 
rate. Alternatively, post-registration research under-
taken under contract with no connection to delinkage 
payments might be more effi  cient. Risk of failure is 
lower in post-approval studies and the research could 
be completed without the fi nancial eff ects of 
discounting.
Second, low-cost worldwide access should be assured 
without patent-based mark-ups. The developer should 
not receive profi t based on usage, and promotional 
activities should be eliminated. On the basis of 
projected and actual health needs, the developer will 
need to produce and make available via standard supply 
chains the needed volumes during the contract period. 
The net global price will be the audited marginal cost of 
production (including appropriate overheads to 
maintain the supply chain and address pharma-
covigilance). To avoid incentives that could result from 
users perceiving a particular drug to be cheap, it might 
be necessary for the drug to have a price similar to that 
of other drugs already on the market and locally 
accessible. Thus, usage would be guided by medical 
need combined with good stewardship practice. The 
diff erence between the audited marginal cost and the 
price paid by the user could be rebated to the global 
purchasing facility.
Third, antibiotic research and development is a 
worldwide issue that cannot be solved by any nation 
alone.32 We propose an integrated worldwide reim-
bursement model with proportional fi nancial 
contributions from, at the very least, members of the 
G20 (which includes Brazil, China, India, Russia, and 
South Africa). Broader participation can occur over 
time and a global institution would be needed to 
coordinate such a venture. Models include GAVI, MMV 
(Medicines for Malaria Venture), and the Medicines 
Patent Pool. The institution will require the ability to 
contract with companies and enjoy stable funding from 
the USA, European Union, and other G20 governments. 
Alternatively, the USA and European Union could 
independently pursue delinked reimbursement 
programmes that are coordinated to align the basic 
incentives towards a common set of goals.33,34
Limitations and further questions
This proposal has many limitations and questions for 
further study (panel). The benchmark payment values 
in table 2 need to be modelled on the basis of audited 
parameters and agreed by many stakeholders. Stable 
funding will be needed, with incremental worldwide 
funding in the range of $2–4 billion per year. However, 
since the worldwide antibiotic market is roughly 
$40 billion per year, investments of this magnitude are 
quite reasonable to preserve this life-saving class of 
drugs.35 Creation of a suitable worldwide authority to 
implement this fund is another obvious constraint, in 
addition to the problem of free riders on the system and 
the absence of an incentive to reduce production 
costs.33,34
Delinkage should guarantee maintenance of 
antibiotics after all reward payouts are completed. This 
can be partly addressed by making on-market main-
tenance a condition of receiving any reward payment. 
Since at least some of the reward payments are likely to 
be staggered (additional label-extending indication 
studies can take up to 2–4 years), individual drugs 
might be supported by remaining payments for up to a 
decade. However, longer-term maintenance is desirable 
and this would entail at least some ongoing contractual 
main tenance arrangements. Providing a steadily 
reducing percentage of the total earned reward for a 
further period of time should be considered, with the 
percentage falling to zero at a point corresponding 
roughly to the typical term of marketing exclusivity. 
Panel: Next steps 
The following steps are crucial to making a model delinked 
from sales a reality:
• Further modelling of the magnitude of payments needed 
to create an appropriate incentive, with such modelling to 
identify ways to account for previous government 
support
• Further modelling of the insurance value of antibiotics
• Consensus on the defi nition of a novel mechanism
• Consensus on the distinct indications that would earn a 
benchmarked payment
• Building commitment from the G20 countries for 
long-term support
• Creation of a global facility to manage the delinked 
purchase process
• Agreement on a process for drugs reaching the end of 
their benchmarked payment period
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Drug production over a very long period of time could 
be contracted to the developer or others willing to 
undertake the tasks.
A further risk is that some investors might view a 
defi ned, fi xed reward as contrary to the high risk–high 
reward model of the biotechnology industry. However, 
our view is that the present market model for antibiotics 
is high risk–low reward and that most investors would 
be pleased to have a predictable return on investment.
Conclusion
We need new antibiotics that have the greatest societal 
value. Delinked payments can be designed with a base 
payment linked to the registration of a new qualifying 
antibiotic and a set of incremental benchmark pay-
ments earned by demonstration of specifi c properties 
of the new drug. The strength of this proposal comes 
from the simplicity of benchmarks and their direct 
linkage to features off ering societal value. The scheme 
encourages novel drugs, foresees the need for multiple 
drugs in a class, and encourages continuing work after 
initial registration.
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